Lt Gen SL Narasimhan (retd)
Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies
ON September 21, 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed the United Nations General Assembly. His speech was titled ‘Bolstering Confidence and Jointly Overcoming Difficulties to Build a Better World’, wherein he proposed the Global Development Initiative (GDI).
This happened just three months after G7 countries proposed an initiative called ‘Build Back Better World (BBBW): An Affirmative Initiative for Meeting the Tremendous Infrastructure Needs of Low- and Middle-Income Countries’. It intended to raise capital from the private sector to partially meet the requirement of $40 trillion needed for infrastructure development in the developing world.
In contrast, the GDI proposed China’s assistance in achieving the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030; the SDGs were accepted by UN member states in 2015. In that speech, Xi mentioned six core principles: staying committed to development as a priority; a people-centred approach; benefits for all to leave no country and no one behind; innovation-driven development; harmony between human and nature; and results-oriented actions.
In January 2022, China launched a Group of Friends for the GDI. Delegates from over 100 countries and international organisations participated in the event held virtually in New York. A virtual high-level meeting of the Group of Friends was held in May 2022; it was addressed by Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China. He mentioned that “the GDI will coordinate development cooperation at the global, regional and national levels to generate a multiplier effect. And for the 17 SDGs, the GDI will encourage international organisations, governments, businesses, academia and civil societies to play their roles.”
In June 2022, Xi chaired a high-level dialogue on global development under the theme, ‘Foster a Global Development Partnership for the New Era to Jointly Implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. The Chair’s statement after the dialogue identified international cooperation in eight priority areas — poverty alleviation, food security, pandemic response and vaccines, financing for development, climate change and green development, industrialisation, digital economy and connectivity in the digital era. It also attached a list of 32 deliverables. To fund this initiative, upgrading China’s South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund to the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund with an additional input of $1 billion on top of the existing $3 billion and enhancing support for the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDTF), established by China, were proposed. This fund commits $200 million for 10 years, which was subsequently extended for another five years. China was to issue a Global Development Report and establish a Global Development Promotion Centre as well as a Global Knowledge Network for Development. The Global Development Report was issued in June 2022 and the Global Development Promotion Centre was established in November.
On the sidelines of the 77th UN General Assembly meeting in September 2022, Wang identified seven additional measures to implement the 2030 Agenda. As part of these measures, the first batch of 50 projects of the GDI project pool was released, of which 10 were claimed to have been completed. Other measures were for food production enhancement, global clean energy cooperation partnership, smart customs, border and connectivity cooperation, world digital education alliance, a global action plan for bamboo as a substitute for plastic, and making available the Sustainable Development Science Satellite (SDGSAT-1).
This satellite was launched by China in November 2021 and it was the first developed specifically for the implementation of the SDGs. It can provide all-time, all-weather, multi-load cooperative observations, achieving global coverage in 11 days with its thermal infrared, low-light-level and multi-spectral imager payloads.
China released a progress report for the GDI in June this year. It mentioned how the eight priority areas related to the SDGs. It assessed the progress of the GDI in the 32 deliverables as seven ‘early harvests’, 14 accomplished, 13 in positive progress and six in the process, and mentioned that progress had been achieved in others. The apparent increase in the number of deliverables is because some of the achievements have been shown as sub-parts of a deliverable.
So, what does one make of this initiative by China? One, China is quick to react to the initiatives of other nations. It launched the Global Initiative on Data Security in response to the Clean Network Initiative of the US, while the GDI was a counter to the BBBW. Two, China tries to ride on the UN system and leverage the UN’s requirements. Both the GDI and the Global Security Initiative of China commit themselves to the UN Charter. Three, she is quick to declare victory. Examples of this are the declaration of the triumph over the Covid-19 pandemic and the GDI progress report. It is not feasible to verify the GDI accomplishments claimed in this report. Four, with the amount of funding mentioned, which may amount to $7 billion from China, one is not sure how the SDGs, which need much more resources, can be achieved. In June, the UN Secretary General stated that an additional funding of about $500 billion per year is needed to attain the SDGs. Five, China wants to increase her global influence, and to do that she is trying to explore multifarious ways. Increasing her global influence is part of the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation. Six, the One Belt, One Road initiative is slowing down and the GDI can either subsume it or supplement it. Lastly, whatever initiative China launches, she puts her full might behind it, sometimes with adverse consequences.
India has launched her own initiatives — the International Solar Alliance, Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, the Coalition for Disaster-Resilient Infrastructure, etc. Recently, in the BRICS summit, PM Narendra Modi proposed the BRICS space exploration consortium.
The GDI may adversely affect India’s quest for an increased role in the UN system. It is also likely to undermine India’s efforts to support countries in their development, particularly in Africa and the Pacific Island Countries. The GDI can also affect the promotion of digital and blue economies, services sector, food security and assistance in energy transition by India. It appears that China is making efforts to usurp the development agenda.
#China
#Xi Jinping
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